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Advocacy as an Exercise in Virtue:
Lawyering, Bad Facts, and
Furman's High-Stakes Dilemma
by Linda H. Edwards*
Two of the conversations benefitting most from Jack Sammons's
scholarship are conversations about legal rhetoric and about virtue
ethics. Legal rhetoric is the study of the conventions of legal argument,
specifically, the art of identifying and evaluating the best available
means of persuasion' and implementing those means effectively in light
of audience, purpose, and occasion.' Virtue ethics approaches moral
reflection by asking what sort of person a particular moral choice
encourages the actor to become.' It focuses on consequences to the
moral agent herself rather than directly focusing on consequences to
* E.L. Cord Foundation Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University
of Nevada, Las Vegas and Robert F. Boden Visiting Professor of Law, Marquette University
School of Law. I would like to thank Dean Joseph Kearney for the opportunity to
participate in this symposium during the Boden visitorship. My thanks also to Matthew
Wright and Julia Jaet for their help with research. This essay is dedicated with deep
gratitude to Jack Lee Sammons, whose unique insights re-focus every legal conversation
he joins. Jack sometimes gives us answers, but more important, he always asks the right
questions.
1. Linda Levine & Kurt M. Saunders, Thinking Like a Rhetor, 43 J. LEG. EDUC. 108,
108 (1993); Brett G. Scharffs, The Character of Legal Reasoning, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
733, 745 (2004); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Rhetoric and Its Denial in Legal Discourse, 76 VA.
L. REV. 1545, 1552-63 (1990).
2. Linda L. Berger, Applying New Rhetoric to Legal Discourse: The Ebb and Flow of
Reader and Writer, Text and Context, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 155, 157-58 (1999); J. Christopher
Rideout & Jill J. Ramsfield, Legal Writing: A Revised View, 69 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56-61
(1994).
3. James F. Keenan, Proposing Cardinal Virtues, 56 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 709,710-15
(1995). MacIntyre proposed personal moral reflection in the form of three questions: "Who
am I? Who ought I to become? How ought I to get there?" Id. at 711; see generally
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (3d ed. 2007).
425
MERCER LAW REVIEW
others. The goal is to become a virtuous person,4 that is, a person who
possesses an integrated5 set of virtues enabling her "to live and act
morally well."' In the spirit of virtue ethics, this paper uses the
primary defense brief in the consolidated cases known as Furman v.
Georgia7 as an example of how good advocacy can help a lawyer practice
virtue, particularly in what may be the most difficult brief-writing
dilemma of all: dealing with bad facts.
This inquiry has its roots in almost everything Jack Sammons has
written, for as Jack has taught us so well, virtue is not an external
constraint on good lawyering but rather a fundamental part of the
narrative of good lawyering.8 And the Furman brief is a relevant text
for our inquiry, especially because years ago, Jack participated in the
moratorium effort that was such an essential part of the Furman
strategy. Also, the choices reflected in the Furman fact state-
ment-especially the choices about how to deal with the disturbing facts
of the case-are the product of the same kind of surprising and creative
choices Jack has made time and again in his teaching and scholarship.
A lifetime of practice and experience9 with these choices builds virtues
of character, just as they have in Jack.
Finally, Jack has always been more interested in inquiry than in
accolades. On an occasion such as this, my guess is that Jack would like
us to show him that we have learned a thing or two from him over the
years. Of course I don't delude myself by thinking that Jack will just
applaud and say, "Hear, hear." In all the years I've known Jack, I have
never written anything that didn't prompt him to tell me how I got it
wrong, or at least how I didn't get it entirely right. But that response
is what I love most in Jack. He is never satisfied to leave his friends
where he finds us. He would rather encourage us to think new thoughts
and, most important, ask new questions. So to paraphrase Jack's own
gracious attribution in Rebellious Ethicsi: With a friend like Jack, I
should have been able to get this right, and he is not to be blamed for
my failure to do so.
4. PAUL WADELL, FRIENDSHIP AND THE MORAL LIE 136 (1989).
5. Keenan, supra note 3, at 714 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE I-H, q.
61, a. 2). The virtues may be integrated, but they can also be in dialectical tension,
challenging each other and therefore further defining each other. Id at 721.
6. Id. at 714. "Virtues do not perfect powers or 'things' inside of us, but rather ways
that we are." Id. at 723.
7. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
8. Jack L. Sammons, Rebellious Ethics and Albert Speer, 1 PROF. ETHICS 77 (1992).
9. DANIEL MARK NELSON, THE PRIORITY OF PRUDENCE: VIRTUE AND NATURAL LAW IN
THOMAS AQUINAS AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN ETHICS xi (1992).
10. Sammons, supra note 8, at 77.
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Two other limitations must be acknowledged at the outset. First,
there is more to say about the Furman fact statement than space here
permits. Second, no analysis oflawyering choices undertaken forty-three
years later by strangers to the case can be complete or fully accurate, for
we cannot account for the full rhetorical context of the case. Even so, we
can learn important lessons )y looking back on Furman's advocacy,
especially in light of the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice,
temperance, and courage." As Father James Keenan has reminded us,
these cardinal virtues make only modest claims in that they are the
"bare essentials" for virtuous action.' 2 Modest they may be, but easy
they are not.
I. THE FURMAN DILEMMA
The death penalty has been described as "the most highly charged
legal, emotional, and ideological issue to come before the United States
Supreme Court." 3 When the Court considers capital punishment,
human lives hang by a thread. The consolidated Furman cases came to
the Court as the culmination of a long, hard-fought effort on the part of
national teams of lawyers working to end the death penalty.1' The use
of capital punishment already had been in decline," and the goal was
to create an effective moratorium on its use, partly in preparation for a
constitutional challenge before the Court."
The day finally came. On June 28, 1971, the Supreme Court granted
review in two murder cases (Aikens v. California and Furman v.
Georgia) and two rape cases (Branch v. Texas and Jackson v. Georgia).
In each case, the defendant had been sentenced to death. In each case,
the Court limited proceedings to the question of whether "the imposition
11. The list of cardinal virtues has been the subject of vigorous debate over the years,
with various hierarchies and additions proposed. For a cogent summary of some relatively
recent arguments, see Keenan, supra note 3, 709-23. Despite arguments about the
relationships among the virtues or other virtues that could be deemed "cardinal," few
would argue that the original four virtues are not qualities important for the making of a
good life.
12. Id. at 714.
13. Sean D. O'Brien, Furman v. Georgia and Roper v. Simmons, in READINGS IN
PERSUASION: BRIEFS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 433, 433 (Linda H. Edwards ed., 2012).
14. MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 23-181 (Quid Pro 2011).
15. Id. at 37-38. During the 1950s, an average of 72 death row inmates were executed
each year, but by the early 1960s the average had fallen to 19. Id. at 135.
16. By the time the primary merits brief in Furman was filed, there had not been an
execution in the United States for over four years. On September 10, 1971, when the
Furman brief was filed, the last execution had occurred in June 1967. Id. at 123. See also
Brief for Petitioner at 37, Aikens v. California, 404 U.S. 933 (1971) (No. 68-5027).
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and carrying out of the death penalty in this case constitute[s] cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 7
Legal argument would be limited to the question certified by the
Court, but as any good lawyer knows, the fact statements had more
complicated work to do. Rhetorically, death appeals fall into four major
categories: (1) possible innocence;"8 (2) mitigation of crime or sentence;
(3) procedural inadequacy;19 and (4) constitutional challenges to the
death penalty itself.2 ° No matter what legal arguments are made later
in the brief, a fact statement in a capital case should raise narrative
concerns in as many of these areas as possible.
The facts of William Henry Furman gave his lawyers at least some
room to work. Furman's facts could be written-and indeed were
written21-to raise questions in the minds of its readers about all four
of these categories. But the facts of Earnest James Aikens were
potentially devastating. Aikens had been convicted of two first-degree
murders committed in the course of entering the homes of two particu-
larly sympathetic women victims. The women had been robbed, raped,
and brutally killed. The sentencing record reflected a third first-degree
murder as well. Aikens seemed like the poster child for the State's
argument in favor of the death penalty.
Not only were the facts of the crimes horrendous, but there was no
room for arguing innocence and little opportunity to argue mitigation.2
The record reflected no procedural error sufficient to support an appeal.
The only possible express argument was the constitutional challenge to
the death penalty itself, but Aikens's facts elicited an unavoidable
human reaction that the death penalty might be an appropriate response
17. Aikens v. California, 403 U.S. 952 (1971) (emphasis omitted); see also MELTSNER,
supra note 14, at 181.
18. A defendant might be completely innocent (for example, because of a misidentifica-
tion) or innocent of the particular crime of which he was convicted (for example, because
while he fired the shot, the killing was unintentional, making him innocent of the death-
eligible crime).
19. Rhetorically, for a procedural issue, defendant's counsel needs to convince the Court
that the procedural issue is serious enough to raise the concern of wrongful convictions in
future cases, even if this particular defendant was guilty.
20. The appeal can challenge the death penalty across the beard or in a particular kind
of case such as minority, as in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), or mental
retardation, as in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
21. O'rien, supra note 13, at 434-36.
22. The record did include some mitigation facts, but only those typical to many capital
defendants. Judges who deal with capital appeals are used to seeing facts like these, and
trying to use them to make a mitigation argument likely would have been met with sighs
and thoughts of "here we go again."
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to his crimes. What's more, the Aikens case was the first-listed
combined murder case. The primary defense brief would be filed in
Aikens, not in Furman or either of the rape cases. Somehow Aikens's
lawyers had to raise narrative concerns about innocence, mitigation, and
procedural weakness. Hardest of all, they had to find a way to deal with
the emotional impact of Aikens's facts.
The virtually unquestioned standard advice about writing a fact
statement is to write in the voice of an advocate, minimizing bad facts
and maximizing helpful facts,23 but the Aikens fact statement made a
different choice.
II. TELLING THE TRUTH 24
The Aikens fact statement is short, shocking, even disorienting.25
Here it is, presented in its entirety2 :
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following a bench trial in the Superior Court of Ventura County,
petitioner Earnest James Aikens, Jr., was convicted of the first-degree
murder of Mrs. Mary Winifred Eaton, on April 26, 1965, and was
sentenced to die for that offense. In consolidated proceedings, he was
at the same time convicted of the first-degree murder of Mrs. Kathleen
Nell Dodd on April 3, 1962, and sentenced to life imprisonment
pursuant to Cal. Penal Code § 190.1, which prohibits the imposition of
the death penalty upon any person who was under the age of eighteen
when the murder was committed. Petitioner was not quite seventeen
when Mrs. Dodd was murdered, and was twenty at the time of the
murder of Mrs. Eaton.
Both of these killings were unmitigated atrocities, committed during
robberies and rapes of the victims after the killer had entered their
homes. Although not overwhelming, the circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution was sufficient to identify petitioner as the
killer. In the penalty trial that followed his conviction of Mrs. Eaton's
murder, the prosecution also showed that petitioner had committed a
23. But see generally Kathryn M. Stanchi, Playing With Fire: The Science of Confronting
Adverse Material in Legal Advocacy, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 381 (2008).
24. Terms like "truth" and "veracity" are associated with many meanings. Here, I use
them to refer to reporting the facts of these crimes straightforwardly, without trying to
minimize or avoid them. I do not mean, however, to require naive expression or to exclude
craft and cunning in the telling. PETER GEACH, THE VIRTUES 114-15 (rprt. 1979).
25. Typically, defense counsel appear always to be trying to help their clients avoid the
consequences of their crimes-helping them "get away with it." But this fact statement
initially causes a reader to think that she is reading the state's brief rather than the
defense brief.
26. Footnotes and citations to the record are omitted here.
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third first-degree murder on June 7, 1962 and a forcible rape on
December 25, 1962. The trial court found that:
"Earnest Aikens has since the age of eleven years of age, or there-
abouts, been involved in an almost continuous pattern of anti-social
and criminal behavior of one sort or another. He has graduated
from petty and minor nuisances and offenses through more serious
proceedings that have involved Juvenile Court wardship and a
commitment to Los Prietos Boys' School and to more recent commit-
ments at the Preston School of Industry and the Youth Training
School, both administered by the California Youth Authority. In the
instances of his parole from the Authority level, his periods of
surcease from criminal behavior have been of short duration. Now
he stands convicted of two brutal, cold-blooded and vicious killings,
together with the finding that I have here earlier made of his
responsibility for a third homicide. Interspersed with the foregoing
have been instances of assault, rape bnd robbery. Such record, at
the very least, demonstrated an indifferent, arrogant and obvious
disregard for the dignity and value of human life and the rights of
others."
The court credited psychiatric findings that petitioner was a
sociopath; found that he had not benefited from rehabilitative efforts
in the past and was not very likely to benefit from them in the future;
found that his criminal behavior was not substantially explained or
mitigated by his upbringing in a fatherless and economically deprived
family, but was attributable to his failure to use those opportunities
that society had given him for a free education and later for institution-
al rehabilitation; and, in view of his "multiple and aggravated crimes
... against the victims . .. involved and, indeed, against society in
general," concluded that he should be put to death.
Petitioner's crimes were indeed aggravated. Mrs. Eaton was a
woman in her sixties, the mother of an acquaintance of petitioner's.
While she was home alone in the middle of the day, her house was
entered; her money and a sharp knife from her kitchen were taken; she
was led to a bedroom; her arms were tied behind her with two belts;
and she was then raped and killed by several wounds of the knife that
plainly establish a deliberate and intentional murder.
Mrs. Dodd was twenty-five years old and five months pregnant when
she was killed. Her house was entered in the late evening, while her
husband was away and her two young children were sleeping. She ran
or was taken from the house to a railroad embankment in the area,
where she was raped. She then ran from the embankment, was
overtaken in a neighbor's driveway, and was killed by numerous stabs
of a knife that had been removed from her kitchen. Money was also
removed from Mrs. Dodd's house.
A more detailed statement of the evidence relating to the killings of
Mrs. Eaton and Mrs. Dodd is set forth in Appendix B to this brief. We
do not place it here because it is lengthy and is not material to our
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constitutional submission in this Court. Our submission is that the
penalty of death is a cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of
first-degree murder-or for any other civilian, peacetime crime-no
matter how aggravated. We make no claim that if the death penalty
can constitutionally be inflicted for any such crime, it cannot be
inflicted upon this petitioner.
His were ghastly crimes-as any intentional killing of a human being
is a ghastly crime-and were attended by aggravating features that
must necessarily arouse the deepest human instincts of loathing and
repugnance. But the issue before this Court cannot turn upon those
features. This is so because if the state may constitutionally punish
petitioner's crimes with death, it may also constitutionally use death
to punish murders unattended by the same features. California's
statutes and its courts in fact do so; and we can conceive no Eighth
Amendment principle which, allowing death punishment in the
particular circumstances of this case, could confine it to them.'
Many paragraphs of this fact statement seem almost to have been
written by the State. The fact statement seems to agree with the State
on nearly every factual point. It describes Aikens's acts with language
like "unmitigated atrocities;" '%rutal, cold-blooded and vicious;" "multiple
and aggravated crimes;" "indeed aggravated;" "deliberate and intention-
al;" "ghastly;" and "arouse the deepest human instincts of loathing and
repugnance." What were the defense lawyers thinking? Could this have
been the prudential choice?
III. THE TRUTH AS THE PRUDENTIAL CHOICE
In its classical sense, prudence (wisdom) is the virtue of discern-
ment-of making wise choices.2" It is the perfection of rational delibera-
tion,' allowing the moral actor to see and select the appropriate
action. 0  Prudence always considers context and practical con-
27. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3-5 (internal citations omitted).
28. NELSON, supra note 9, at ix.
29. THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON THE VIRTUES 110 (John A. Oesterle trans., Univ.
Notre Dame Press 1984).
30. Popular culture sometimes seems to misunderstand prudence in two equally
problematic ways. Prudence can be confused with self-righteous rejection of pleasure
(being"prudish"). MITCH FINLEY, THE CATHOLIC VIRTUES: SEVEN PILLARS OF A GOOD LIFE
49 (1999). Or prudence can be misunderstood as undue caution. NELSON, supra note 9, at
ix. But prudence in the classical sense is quite another matter. If prudence referred to
undue caution, it could hardly be practiced alongside its sister virtue of courage. Rather,
prudence "discern[s] our true good in every circumstance and... choose[s] the right means
of achieving it." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 444 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2d
ed. 1994).
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straints.31 It is grounded in the messiness of human reality, ordering
our practical wisdom toward a worthy goal.32 At a minimum, prudence
requires the actor to gather all available information, to seek and value
input from others, and to weigh all possible options. 33 Most relevant
here, prudence looks beyond conventional practice, searching for the best
answer, not the safest or least surprising.
Conventional defense practice would try to put the best face possible
on the facts. It typically takes what John Gardner has called the third-
person subjective point of view.34 The writer adopts a subjective
perspective, presenting the facts either through the eyes of the client or
through other eyes sympathetic to the client. After reading a conven-
tional fact statement, a reader can easily identify the factual arguments
being made. For example, if a mitigation fact is stated, the reader would
know immediately and without question that the defense lawyer is
trying to argue mitigation, whether expressly stated or not.35 If facts
are characterized, the characterizations are sympathetic to the client.
In the Aikens fact statement, the pressure to take that conventional
route was surely overwhelming, but the conventional choice simply
would not work here. The record would not support obvious arguments
of innocence, mitigation, or procedural error. Pointing out the few,
small, painfully inadequate helpful facts would send a message that the
lawyers were simply going through the motions on a losing case. Nor
could the brief avoid the emotional impact of the facts of the crimes. The
State's brief would shortly follow.3" Without doubt, the State's attorney
was happily anticipating the chance to set out the Aikens facts in detail.
Any emotionally laden fact omitted by the defense would be touted there,
and it would seem that the defense was not being straightforward with
the Court. And if these facts appeared first in response to the defense's
constitutional argument, they would be positioned structurally to seem
like a legitimate response to the constitutional question. In other words,
31. FINLEY, supra note 30, at 51-52.
32. Keenan, supra note 3, at 717.
33. FINLEY, supra note 30, at 58-59.
34. JOHN GARDNER, THE ART OF FICTION: NOTES ON CRAFT FOR YOUNG WRITERS 155-59
(1984).
35. The writer's purpose could be express ("The State alleged that [insert allegation].
But [insert various contrary facts from the record].") or could be contextually implied (The
first paragraph of the fact statement: "The defendant's parents had separated before his
birth. He lived primarily with his alcoholic mother and her succession of male friends,
some of whom sexually abused him beginning at about the age of eight."). The point is that
either way, any reader can tell that the writer is attempting to make a particular point.
36. The brief for the State of California was filed on September 24, 1971. Brief for
Respondent, Aikens v. California, 404 U.S. 933 (1971) (No. 68-5027).
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it would seem that horrendous acts justify the death penalty. These
crimes could not be minimized. Loathing and repugnance surely are the
only possible human reactions.
The risky unconventional choice, then, would be to say the worst
before the State had a chance to say it. As it turns out, at least ten
reasons support brutal honesty as the prudential choice:
Credibility. Most obviously, the choice was so surprising that it surely
would earn big credibility points. If the defense lawyers are prepared to
be this honest about these facts, the other parts of their brief must be
taken seriously indeed.
Preempting Opposing Strategies. Presenting the facts so starkly
confuses the State's expected response.37 Simply repeating these facts
would irritate the Court and make the State look silly. Adding more
detail-detail already provided in the defense exhibit-would result in a
lengthy fact statement made less readable by many distracting citations
to the record. The Court might be tempted to skim or skip such a long
and visually unappealing section, especially since the defense version
seems to have already honestly provided what the Court needs to
know.3" The only other options would be to ignore the facts of the
crimes or to treat them essentially as procedural background. Either
way, the State would seem, rhetorically, to agree with the defense
position that the facts of the crimes are irrelevant. None of these
options seems ideal for the State's purposes.
Inoculation. Since these facts would be presented to the Court one
way or another,3 9 presenting them early may trigger some degree of
reader inoculation. The social science theory of inoculation posits that
a reader develops resistance to negative information disclosed early and
by the party with the most to lose.4 ° Voluntarily raising and refuting
37. See, e.g., THOMAS MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 70-71 (7th ed. 2007).
38. The State chose this option. The brief for the State includes a thirty-four-page fact
statement filled with individual facts and multiple record cites on many lines. Early pages
squander valuable persuasive real estate with a description of procedural history, so it is
tempting to stop reading and move on to the argument section.
39. Indeed, they already had been presented preliminarily since there had been filings
below and filings pursuant to the certiorari procedure.
40. Stanchi, supra note 23, at 399-424; see also James F. Stratman, Investigating
Persuasive Processes in Legal Discourse in Real Time: Cognitive Biases and Rhetorical
Strategy in Appeal Court Briefs, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 1, 7-13 (1994).
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negative information is sometimes referred to as "stealing thunder,"4'
and studies show that early voluntary disclosure may be more effective
than ignoring negative information that will shortly be raised by an
opponent.42
Boomerang Effect. The inoculation effect is increased here by the fact
statement's insistence on using negative language that verges on
overstatement. Yes, these crimes were very bad, and on first encounter-
ing the language, a reader does have a predictable emotional reaction.
But after reading several pages of language like "unmitigated atrocities;"
"brutal, cold-blooded and vicious;" "ghastly;" and "arouse the deepest
human instincts of loathing and repugnance," the reader can begin to
tire of the extreme descriptors. A small resistance begins to build. The
reader may find herself thinking, "Okay, this was bad, but the language
is starting to seem a little strong." Pushing a reader toward a particular
reaction can trigger psychological reactance, a phenomenon in which a
reader begins to defend her autonomous decisionmaking.43 This
reaction is sometimes called a "boomerang effect" and, perversely, causes
the reader to lean in the opposite direction."" Usually, legal writers
want to avoid psychological reactance because they are making an
express argument they want their readers to accept. Here, though, the
Aikens fact statement uses psychological reactance paradoxically, to
overstate an argument the writers want their readers to resist.
Point of View. Instead of using an advocate's voice (the third-person
subjective), the fact statement uses what John Gardner has called the
third-person objective point of view.45 The writer uses a voice more like
that of the judicial law clerk writing a bench memo than that of an
advocate writing a brief. Because the perspective sounds objective, it
seems more trustworthy. The third-person objective produces "an ice-
cold camera's-eye recording. We see events, hear dialogue, observe the
41. Kipling D. Williams et al., The Effects of Stealing Thunder in Criminal and Civil
Trials, 17 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 597 (1993).
42. Kathryn Stanchi, What Cognitive Dissonance Tells Us About Tone in Persuasion,
22 J.L. & PoLY 93, 118-19 (2013).
43. Michael Burgoon et al., Revisiting the Theory of Psychological Reactance:
Communicating Threats to Attitudinal Freedom, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK
DEVELOPMENTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 213,215-16 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau
eds., 2002); Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006
MICH. ST. L. REv. 411, 428.
44. Burgoon, supra note 43, at 215-16; Stanchi, supra note 43, at 422.
45. GARDNER, supra note 34, at 155-59.
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setting, and make guesses about what the characters are thinking."4
The point of view is characterized by a certain "savage sparsity,"47 and
the reader, free of the claustrophobia of a subjective perspective,' is
instead invited to wonder about what is not directly stated. Ostensibly
presented for other purposes, small helpful facts take on increased
credibility and importance, and a reader wonders what other facts might
support an argument not made expressly here.49
Smuggled Facts. The third-person objective point of view and the
brutal honesty about the crime allows the writer to smuggle into the fact
statement Aikens's few helpful facts without appearing to use them to
make a losing legal argument or a futile appeal to sympathy. Once we
look, we can see this strategy subtly used throughout the entire fact
statement. For example, we learn that Aikens was very young when his
age is introduced purportedly as part of a procedural explanation for
why the first murder did not result in a death sentence.50 As part of
the sentencing judge's explanation for choosing death, we learn that
Aikens suffered from a mental disorder, having been diagnosed with
sociopathy.5 ' Rather than seeing Aikens's mental condition as a
mitigating factor, this trial judge actually relied on the disorder to
justify the death sentence. In fact, the judge's quoted language includes
the finding that Aikens demonstrated an 'indifferent, arrogant and
obvious disregard for the dignity and value of human life,"52 language
a reader can recognize as almost a dictionary definition of sociopathy.53
46. Id. at 157.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. The Justices had, after all, limited the issue to the constitutional challenge.
50. "Petitioner was not quite seventeen when Mrs. Dodd was murdered, and was
twenty at the time of the murder of Mrs. Eaton." Brief for Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3.
51. Sociopathy is the extreme form of antisocial personality disorder, classified as one
of the recognized personality disorders, such as borderline personality, paranoia, and
schizotypal disorder. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) in effect at the time
of Aikens's sentencing classifies sociopathy in the broad category of "sociopathic personality
disturbance" and the more specific forms of "antisocial reaction," and "dyssocial reaction."
The DSM warns that "sociopathic reactions are very often symptomatic of severe
underlying personality disorder, neurosis, or psychosis, or occur as the result of organic
brain injury or disease. Before a definitive diagnosis in this group is employed, strict
attention must be paid to the possibility of the presence of a more primary personality
disturbance." THE COMM. ON NOMENCLATURE & STATISTICS OF THE AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL: MENTAL DISORDERS 38 (1952).
52. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 16, at 4.
53. "The court credited psychiatric findings that petitioner was a sociopath [citation to
the record] . . . ." Id.
2015] 435
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The fact statement has employed dramatic irony: A careful reader
realizes the significance of the diagnosis, a realization that was lost on
the sentencing judge.
Immediately following the description of the crimes as "unmitigated
atrocities" and as part of the most serious concession of all (the
identification of Aikens as the killer),5 4 we learn that the evidence at
trial was entirely circumstantial and was not especially compelling.55
After the fact statement has called the crimes "unmitigated atroci-
ties,"56 the next phrase, "[alithough not overwhelming,"5 7 has far more
credibility than it otherwise would have, sounding almost like an
understatement. A tiny seed of doubt has been planted. No direct
argument of misidentification was made, however, so the fact statement
does not have to detail the circumstantial evidence in the record. Even
if the State's responsive brief describes the evidence sufficiently to
eliminate doubt as to Aikens's guilt, the reader now knows that less-
than-compelling circumstantial evidence can condemn a defendant to
death. Aikens may be guilty in this case, but it is almost certain that
if such circumstantial evidence can be sufficient, some innocent
defendants will be sentenced to die.
Ironically and intentionally, the second paragraph asserts that the
crimes were "unmitigated" and then sets out the mitigation facts of
Aikens's life.5" The story continues in the third-person objective voice,
ostensibly as simple procedural history and as a statement of the
justification for the death sentence. But dramatic irony again allows a
careful reader to draw other conclusions. The section begins with quoted
language from the trial judge, explaining the choice of death. In the
judge's own words, we learn that since at least the age of eleven, Aikens
was a fatherless,59 lost boy. There is no evidence of any supportive
adult in his life-only institutionalizations at the hands of the State. We
learn that part of the justification for the death sentence was Aikens's
"failure to use those opportunities that society had given him for a free
54. While the fact statement appears to concede the sufficiency of the identification, as
it surely must, the recitation of the facts of the crimes uses passive-voice verbs almost
entirely. A reader imagines the visual images of these crimes, but the perpetrator remains
in the shadows. The focus remains on the actions themselves. Id. at 3-4.
55. "Although not overwhelming, the circumstantial evidence presented by the
prosecution was sufficient to identify petitioner as the killer." Id. at 3.
56. "Both of these killings were unmitigated atrocities, committed during robberies and
rapes of the victims after the killer had entered their homes." Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 3-4.
59. "The court... found that his criminal behavior was not substantially explained...
by his upbringing in a fatherless and economically deprived family ...." Id. at 4.
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education [the public school system?] and later for institutional
rehabilitation."60 A careful reader can see in these words the attitude
of the sentencing judge toward young men like Aikens, and his naive
assumptions about the nature of "institutional rehabilitation." A reader
can also see what the trial judge did not-that the State failed this child
and now intends to kill the young man he has become.
Further, the knowledge that the evidence was entirely circumstantial
and "not overwhelming" combines with another fact-quietly dropped into
the first paragraph-that Aikens was tried for these two completely
unrelated murders in the same trial. A careful reader will realize that
the consolidation surely would have been greatly prejudicial to Aikens.
The combination of the consolidation and the quoted language from the
sentencing judge smacks of a judicial desire simply to dispose of this
young man as expeditiously as possible.
These facts, smuggled into the statement ostensibly for other purposes,
have allowed defense lawyers to give us a picture of Aikens's life without
appearing to be using the facts to make an argument on his behalf.
Instead, careful readers believe that they have thought of the mitigation,
innocence, and procedural implications themselves and are therefore
more inclined to give those implications at least some credence."1 They
may also be affected by the desire for self-affirmation, a psychological
phenomenon in which a reader wants to demonstrate admirable
characteristics and resists threats that imply less-than-admirable
characteristics.6 2 Here, the reader may want to avoid being (and avoid
appearing to be) the kind of person who is untroubled by the implica-
tions raised by these smuggled facts.
The unobtrusive personalization also has been enhanced by the order
of its appearance (preceding the facts of the crimes) and also by the
language used to refer to capital punishment. In part because death is
so difficult to consider in any concrete way, we have become almost
immune to the reality of "the death penalty." We read right over the
words without noticing what we are really talking about. The routine
usage of the term hides the deep emotionality and moral contestability
of state-imposed killing. Having subtly personalized Aikens, the fact
statement uses "the death penalty" only twice and only at points when
the reader's somnolence may be either desirable or irrelevant.' All
other references use fresher terms in order to awaken the reader to the
60. Id
61. LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 75 (3d ed. 2011).
62. KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND CONTEXT 67 (1981);
Stanchi, supra note 43, at 420-21.
63. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 16, at 3, 5.
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reality of what truly is at issue here: "[he] was sentenced to die;'64
"concluded that he should be put to death;"65 "the penalty of death;"66
"punish petitioner's crimes with death;" 7 "use death to punish;' and
"allowing death punishment."6 9
Focus on Victims. The fact statement's description of the crimes
focuses on the victims, not on Aikens. The two paragraphs that set out
the facts of the crimes are written almost entirely in the passive voice.
The victims are the grammatical subjects of most sentences in these two
paragraphs. The camera places the victims in their homes. Then they
ran or were led. One was bound. They were raped and killed. The fact
statement puts the actions themselves in clear focus, but avoids placing
Aikens in the scenes. In this mental video, the actor remains a shadowy
figure. The descriptions of the actions distract the reader from picturing
Aikens as the perpetrator.
Showing and Telling. The fact statement also artfully chooses
between "showing" and "telling." Conventional advice teaches brief
writers generally to show rather than tell, that is, to present the facts
themselves rather than characterizing them for the reader. Showing
rather than telling invites the reader to come to her own conclusions and
therefore increases her attachment to those conclusions. When referring
to the crimes, the Aikens fact statement tends to do more telling than
showing, characterizing the crimes with negative labels and broad
descriptions of actions. 70 But when referring to the mitigation facts,
the statement tends toward "showing," providing factual details that
invite the reader to reach her own conclusions.71 In other words, the
fact statement tends to "tell" when describing the crimes and the victims
and tends to "show" when describing Aikens. The fact statement had to
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 4. The phrase was strategically placed at the end of the procedural history
in a position of emphasis.
66. Id. at 5.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. The description of the crimes is factual, but it is positioned at a fairly large psychic
distance. "When psychic distance is great, we look at the scene as if from far away-our
usual position in the traditional tale, remote in time and space, formal in presentation
... " Gardner, supra note 34, at 111.
71. Specifically, the fact statement sets out facts about Aikens's life since the age of
eleven. Other than referring to Aikens as growing up in a "fatherless and economically
deprived family," the only characterizations in that section are those of the sentencing
judge, included for the purpose of showing the judge's attitude and factual assessment.
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do enough "showing" to satisfy a reader that the facts had been
presented rather than avoided; but once that threshold had been met,
the statement predominately uses the strategy of "telling." Even such
strongly negative characterizations like "ghastly crimes" are less
damaging than "showing" the facts.72
Aikido Move. The descriptions of the crimes, the focus on the victims,
and the use of the third-person objective voice have led the reader to the
crucial key clause: "His were ghastly crimes-as any intentional killing
of a human being is a ghastly crime." 3 Everything in the fact state-
ment has been leading up to these words. The strategy is a classic
Aikido7 ' move. Rather than resisting the opponent's attack, the fact
statement redirects its force. The statement has elicited in us "the
deepest human instincts of loathing and repugnance," but has postponed
ever-so-briefly the moment at which it presents us with a target for
those emotions. Now, in the last paragraph, the fact statement presents
the target. It turns those instincts of loathing and repugnance back
upon the State's desire to use the death penalty. The State wants to do
what Aikens has done.
Forming Relationships. Finally we consider what may be the most
important but least obvious advantage of the brutally truthful fact
statement: crossing the rhetorical gulf potentially separating defense
counsel from the crucial swing voters on the Court. Generally speaking,
a capital defender representing a client with bad facts will be in an
inherently difficult rhetorical position. A great personal, social, and
moral gulf separates most judges from most capital defendants, making
it extraordinarily difficult for a judge to identify with or understand
what the defendant's experiences may have been.75 That lack of
72. The factual details were placed in an appendix.
73. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 16, at 5.
74. Aikido is a martial art in which the combatant redirects the opponent's attack
rather than attempting to block it head on. Therefore, it uses the opponents own force
against him.
75. On the occasion of remembering the life of Justice Lewis Powell, J. Harvie
Wilkinson III, then the Chief Judge of the Fourth Circuit, wrote that "[ilt would be remiss
... to think that anyone's judicial life could be wholly unaffected by background." In
Memoriam, Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 112 HARv. L. REV. 589, 592 (1999) (remarks by Chief
Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit). The Aikens trial judge may serve as an example of this rhetorical difficulty, as
shown by the judge's opinion that a young man in Aikens's situation could be expected, on
pain of death, to appreciate the State's provision of a free education and various
institutionalizations and to therefore choose to turn his life around.
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understanding can overflow into personal disapproval of or at least
puzzlement about a lawyer who chooses to represent such a client. Very
few judges would identify career capital defenders as part of their own
social or professional group.
All capital defenders face this distance to one extent or another, but
at this particular time, in this particular case, we can be more specific
about the rhetorical situation facing Aikens's lawyers. Justices Burger,
Blackmun, and Rehnquist were thought to be irretrievably opposed to
the defense position, and Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall were
thought to be safely in the defense camp. 6 The crucial votes would be
cast by Justices Powell, Stewart, and White.
Predictably, these justices had little relevant experience with Aikens's
experience or with the world of lawyers who would choose a career of
representing the Aikenses of the world. Potter Stewart had grown up in
a Cincinnati family deeply immersed in Republican politics and living
in a "house of grand proportions."7 He attended a private University
School in his early years and subsequently attended Hotchkiss School,
a Connecticut boarding school dedicated to preparing students for
Yale. 8 After graduating from Yale Law School, Stewart had practiced
at the Wall Street firm then known as Debevoise, Stevenson, Plimpton
& Page for a total of about three years before returning to Cincinnati to
begin his own political career. 9 He joined Cincinnati's most prestigious
firm, Dinsmore, Shohl, Sawyer & Dinsmore, a blue-chip firm with a list
of blue-chip clients.s" He moved into an exclusive neighborhood and
chose a house across the street from the Cincinnati Country Club.81 He
promptly began his own political career, and by the time he was
appointed to the Sixth Circuit, at age 39, he had practiced law full time
for only six years.82
Byron White's background was equally far removed from the world of
Earnest Aikens. White had grown up in a frontier family on the
Colorado prairie.8 His early life was characterized by a stable family
76. MELTSNER, supra note 14, at 205.
77. Potter Stewart once related the story that when the family moved into the house,
his father had managed to get lost in it. Joel Jacobsen, Remembered Justice: The
Background, Early Career and Judicial Appointments of Justice Potter Stewart, 35 AKRON
L. REv. 227, 229-30 (2002).
78. Id. at 230.
79. Id. at 233-35.
80. Id. at 235.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 243.
83. Leon E. Irish, Byron White: A Singular Life, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 883, 883 (2003).
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life, hard work, and fishing trips with his father.' After graduating
from Yale Law School in 1946, White settled in Denver to capitalize on
the city's rapid growth and resultant professional opportunities.' He
joined a well-respected firm, now known as Davis, Graham & Stubbs,
with a long list of corporate and commercial clients.s White set about
both representing these clients and bringing in similar clients of his
own. 7 He married, began a family, continued fishing, and took up
golf." There is no indication that he spent time in the world of career
criminal defense lawyers. Perhaps tellingly, he once explained his
disapproval of "promot[ing] causes."89
Nor did Lewis Powell likely have a personal or professional under-
standing of someone like Earnest Aikens or his lawyers. Before joining
the Court, Powell had been a "classic 'corporate lawyer' and a 'pillar of
the American legal establishment."'9s He received his LL.M. from the
Harvard Law School in 1932 and practiced commercial law with Hunton
and Williams for nearly forty years. 9' He represented major corporate
clients and served on the boards of directors of eleven major corpora-
tions.92 One commentator observed that "[wihen Justice Powell woke
up in his sixty-fourth year a Justice of the Supreme Court, he remained
very much the lawyer who for thirty-five years had gone to bed
defending the interests of many of America's largest corporations."
9 3
His life before joining the Court did not include clients like Aikens and
likely did not bring him into contact with lawyers like career capital
defenders. Chief Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson used these words to
describe Powell's life prior to taking the bench:
We cannot deny that Lewis Powell was an aristocrat. He lived in the
most sequestered section of Richmond, Virginia. He managed the city's
most prominent law firm. He represented its most affluent corporate
clients, belonged to its most exclusive country clubs, sent his children
84. Id. at 884-85.
85. Robert H. Harry, Byron White: The Practicing Lawyer, 75 U. COLO. L. REv. 203,
203-04 (2004).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 204.
88. Id. at 207.
89. Id. at 208.
90. Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 28 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 379,
380 (1988).
91. Id. at 379.
92. Id. at 380.
93. Id. at 384-85 (quoting Burt Neuborne, Lewis F. Powell, in THE JUSTICES OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVEs AND MAJOR OPINIONS, THE BURGER COURT
79 (1978)).
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to its most privileged schools, and became its most revered and
reputable public servant.'
Powell was appointed to the Court as part of President Nixon's effort
to shift the Court to favor the police and prosecutors.95 Quite apart
from any sense of professional mandate, Powell was inclined to be
"suspicious" of lawyers and others who sought federal solutions to the
issues of the day.96 Perhaps as a result of his many years of practice
and of some relevance here, Powell was known to pay particular
attention to the facts of each case."
Clearly, these three swing voters had little personal or professional
association with the world of criminal defense and might wonder what
kind of lawyer would choose a client like Aikens. Though they would not
admit it, perhaps not even to themselves, one or more of these justices
might personally disrespect criminal defense lawyers as a group. Yet
later in the brief, Aikens's lawyers would call on "our" traditions,
heritage, and aspirations9" to critique what "we" now do and to
argue that it is time for "us" to reject the penalty of death."i° The
heart of the argument would center of the kind of a people "we" choose
to be.
For such an ethical 1 ' argument to succeed, there must first be a
"we." The defense lawyers must be in a relational position to use those
pronouns with the Court. The effectiveness of any argument is affected
94. In Memoriam, supra note 75, at 591-92 (remarks by Chief Judge J. Harvie
Wilkinson III of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit).
95. Galloway, supra note 90, at 383.
96. In Memoriam, supra note 75, at 608 (remarks by Christina B. Whitman).
97. "For Powell, the facts always came first." David 0. Stewart, Lewis Powell: A
Lawyer's Justice, 73 A.B.A. J. 46 (1987).
98. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 16, at 36 ("Ihe nations of the world most
closely allied with our own in traditions, and sharing our heritage and aspirations... have
now overwhelmingly rejected the death penalty.").
99. See, for example: "The concealment, the secrecy, with which we hide away our
executions .... " Id. at 43; "We hide our executions because we are disgusted to look at
them .... " Id. at 48; "The one way of killing a human being is not more cruel to him than
the other, although it is intolerably more cruel to us." Id. at 49; "As rarely as we tolerate
the infliction of the death penalty today, we still more rarely tolerate its infliction upon us."
Id. at 54; "[OJur modern development of large-scale penal and correctional institutions
which we must maintain whether or not we use them for 'capital' criminals, and into which
we can now also place our 'capital' criminals if we choose." Id. at 55.
100. See, e.g., id. at 56 ("It is the profound appreciation that, once we have developed
an alternative, it would be intolerably cruel not to use it." (footnote omitted)).
101. Ethos is an appeal based on character. Linda L. Berger, Studying and Teaching
'Law as Rhetoric". A Place to Stand, 16 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3,48-51(2010). An ethical
argument can rely on the character of the writer and also on the character of the reader.
Both are implicated here.
EXERCISE IN VIRTUE
by the reader's perception of the writer's ethos,1 °2 but an argument
about "us" makes a relationship of trust and understanding an absolute
necessity.103 The acid test would be these lawyers' reaction to the facts
of these crimes. They would need to join the justices' reaction to "these
ghastly crimes," for a judge surely could not identify with someone who
would not find these murders ghastly.
But a lawyer who shares the justices' near-certain reaction to these
facts can effectively ask the Court to do something hard-that is, to
decide that Aikens and others like him should be allowed to live. The
lawyers had to do more than tell the Court that the facts were irrele-
vant. They had to show the Court that "we" can react to these facts with
the "deepest human instincts of loathing and repugnance" and still reject
the sentence of death. Only someone who could join the Court in its
visceral reaction to these facts could effectively argue that the facts,
though horrendous, were irrelevant to the constitutional question.
Demonstrating a human reaction to these crimes was, in a sense, the
price of admission to this legal conversation.
What we see in the Aikens fact statement, then, is a strategy that tells
the truth, yet turns traditional factual assumptions on their heads. The
choice was risky to be sure, and not all of the strategies would succeed.
The defense brief had to rely on its key readers-Justices Powell,
Stewart, and White-to be smart, careful, sophisticated readers who
might be willing to engage the issues afresh. Since so much of a reader's
reaction is out of the writer's control, the risk was high. But the
alternatives were worse.
When Furman's nine opinions were finally filed, Justices Stewart and
White had voted to overturn these death sentences, resulting in a five-
four win. We cannot know which lawyering decisions affected that
outcome the most, but the honesty of the fact statement may well have
played a key role.
IV. TRUTH-TELLING AND THE CARDINAL VIRTUES
We have been speaking primarily of the cardinal virtue of prudence,
but all the cardinal virtues are integrally related,' and choosing to
tell the truth requires practice in the other virtues as well. 105 The
102. Id. at 45-50. Steven D. Jamar, Aristotle Teaches Persuasion: The Psychic
Connection, 8 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 61, 73 (2002); Levine & Saunders, supra note 1,
at 112.
103. Jamar, supra note 102, at 73.
104. Keenan, supra note 3, at 728.
105. GEACH, supra note 24, at 110-17.
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virtue of justice (fairness) is inherently associated with equality' and
with giving each individual her due.10 7 Justice's goals are not primari-
ly about some superficial notion of fair play, with each person entitled
to retribution for suffered wrongs or to her own slice of some metaphori-
cal pie. 0 8 Rather justice acts out of the conviction that all people-both
Aikens and his victims-deserve to live as human a life as possible and
deserve to have their stories told. 09 The decision to frankly admit
Aikens's crimes acknowledges the lives of his victims while working to
save his life as well.
The virtue of temperance, perhaps better called restraint, controls
personal desire so that craving does not overpower wise choice. 10
More than merely controlling bodily cravings (food, drink, sex),
temperance also controls powerful emotional reactions. It enables wise
action in spite of anger, fear, or even passionate conviction. This fact
statement required practice in temperance. Aikens's lawyers had
devoted most of their professional lives to ending the death penalty."'
To say that they were passionate about their cause would be an
understatement. Yet, to implement their strategy, they had to write a
fact statement that sounded objective"' and that exposed their most
vulnerable positions. Telling the truth probably felt like a self-inflicted
wound."3 These lawyers had to control their own strong emotional
responses for the sake of prudential advocacy.
The final cardinal virtue, courage, allows the actor to forge ahead in
the face of fear, uncertainty, and intimidation. Courage enables fidelity
106. "Paul Ricoeur notes that from Aristotle to Rawlsjustice is always associated with
equality." Keenan, supra note 3, at 724.
107. Id. at 719.
108. FINLEY, supra note 30, at 71-72.
109. Id. at 70-72.
110. GEACH, supra note 24, at 131.
111. MELTSNER, supra note 14, at 23-181.
112.
If briefs to the court were gymnastics events, their statements of fact would be
performed on the balance beam. Writing a persuasive statement is accomplished
not by following one set of rules, but by balancing your use of various techniques
to maintain credibility while achieving the stance needed to highlight favorable
facts. It does not require the brute force of emphatic language so much as a subtle
blend of strength and control of structure and detail. It involves much thought,
consideration of alternatives, and monitoring the interactions of various
techniques. Yet an excellent statement of facts looks natural and effortless, just
like a complex routine looks easy when performed by a skilled gymnast.
MARY BARNARD RAY & BARBARA J. Cox, BEYOND THE BASICS: A TEXT FOR ADVANCED
LEGAL WRITING 167 (2d ed. 2003) (footnotes omitted).
113. Stanchi, supra note 23, at 381.
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in the face of divided loyalties and chooses hope over despair, even in the
darkest situation."4 Choosing the truth about Aikens's crimes re-
quired practice in courage. The overwhelming urge to downplay bad
facts comes directly from fear, and defying convention when so much is
at stake is a truly frightening choice. It required Courage with a capital
"C."
Facing the Aikens facts head-on required Aikens's lawyers to practice
all four cardinal virtues while balanced precariously on the life and
death high-wire of capital defense. Their choices provide us with a
telling example of how good advocacy can help a lawyer learn and
practice virtue even in the most difficult settings and roles.
V. CONCLUSION
Aikens's lawyers achieved their most immediate goal."' They saved
the lives of their clients and the 628 other men and two women then on
death row."6 Most were southern black men without a history of
serious violence." 7 About half were eventually paroled. Only a small
percentage have committed new crimes, very few of which were
violent.1 ' Seven were subsequently proven completely innocent."9
And the goal of virtue ethics-to practice the virtue necessary to
become more fully and deeply human 2°-was achieved as well. Thatgoal is, for each of us, a life-long project. But happily, the practice of law
114. FINLEY, supra note 30, at 84. Choosing hope over despair is a fundamental
necessity for a capital defender, who must go to work each day knowing that some of her
clients will die despite her greatest efforts. Yet she must continue to work to save as many
as possible, all the while hoping for repentance and reform, healing and reconciliation.
115. Four years after the Furman decision, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976),
approved a new version of the death penalty, but subsequent cases have further limited
its use. See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (mandatory death
penalty statues unconstitutional); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (death penalty for
adult rape unconstitutional); see Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (death penalty for juveniles
unconstitutional); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 (death penalty for mentally retarded unconstitu-
tional). In nearly all successful death penalty challenges since 1971, the Aikens brief has
provided the blueprint for the defense argument.
116. MELSTNER, supra note 14, at 216. Lawyers for the NAACP Legal Defense Fund
were counsel in three of the four consolidated cases, including those of Aikens and Furman.
Id. at 181.
117. James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-
Commuted Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 LOY. L.A.
L. REV. 5, 15 (1989).
118. Id. at 23-26.
119. O'Brien, supra note 13, at 437-38.
120. FINLEY, supra note 30, at 116.
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provides us with what Jack Sammons has called "the imaginative and
intellectual skills" we need to achieve it.1
21
121. Sammons, supra note 8, at 141.
